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INTERPRETATION OF INTERPERSONAL UTILITY COM-
P ARISONS: POSmvE, NORMATIVE OR DESCRIPTIVE 




While interpersonal utility comparisons are indispensable to the 
determination of utility maxima, their interpretation as either norma-
tive or positive produces awkward conclusions. 
This paper alternatively reinterprets interpersonal utility comparisons 
as descriptive and value-laden rather than as either normative of 
positive. On this basis they are characterized as functional concepts, 
and are thus argued to be objective. This treatment suggests that it is 
possible to derive evaluative statements from descriptive ones, contrary 
to the usual view of the is-ought problem. Recent philosophy of 
language results are employed to support these views. 
1. Introduction 
Since Musgrave (1959) it has been conventional to separate govern-
ment activity into allocation and redistdbution decisions, a distinc-
tion that also traditionally divides positive and normative public 
choice (Mueller, 1979, p.263). The difference between choices that 
benefit all members of the community and those that benefits some 
at the expense of others corresponds to the difference between 
moves to the Pareto frontier and moves along it. In normative 
public choice theory, social welfare functions, deriving originally 
from Bergson (1938) and especially Samuelson (1947), have 
embodied this distinction for 
W = W(Ul , UlJ ..• , Un) 
where W is a real-valued function and the Vi are individual utility 
indexes, by requiring the Pareto principles as a necessary condition 
for maximization of W such that the familiar efficiency conditions 
apply. The individual utility indexes have generally been assumed to 
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be ordinal, particularly since Robbins' critique (1937) of cardinal 
interpersonal utility comparisons as normative. 
However it has been shown that the Bergson-Samuelson social 
welfare function defined over ordinal utility indexes must be dicta-
torial if it is to select a single outcome consistently (Kemp and Ng, 
1976; Parks, 1976). The Kemp-Ng impossibility theorem parallels 
Arrow's original impossibility theorem for axiomatic public choice, 
both in terms of the general structure of the proof and in intent. 1 
In effect, without information about the intensity of preferences the 
Paretian social welfare function is insufficiently rich for a consistent 
non-:dictorial determination of a best point on the Pareto frontier, 
and thus inadequate for the identification of a utility maximum over 
both allocation and redistributive decisions. Yet this does not imply 
that social welfare function framework must be abandoned. Accept-
ing Robbins' view that interpersonal utility comparisons are nonna-
tive, Kemp-Ng state that 
'it remains open to any individual to play the role of 
ethical observer, prepared to engage in interpersonal 
comparisons of cardinal individual welfares . 
to produce a social welfare function (Kemp and Ng, 1976, p.65). 
Yet this presents problems for the social welfare function tradition 
of normative public choice theory. If the individual utility indexes 
that are arguments in the social welfare function are both cardinal 
and interpersonally comparable, then the conventional distinction 
between presumably uncontroversial allocation decisions and the 
more intractable redistribution ones is undermined, since the Pareto 
frontier ceases to have meaning in this framework. Indeed, because 
the traditional division between positive and nonnative theory 
depends upon a descriptive non-normative judgments concerning a 
social welfare maximum, the very character of economics as a 
discipline that distinguishes explanation and recommendation is 
itself jeopardized. Nor is it by any means clear that an alternative 
foundation of comparable force and objectivity is available to 
economics in the normative cardinal framework, since as noted by 
Pattanaik (1968) and Sen (1970), should individual ethical observers 
differ in their ethical preferences, then Arrow's problem of obtain-
ing a social ranking from divergent individual rankings may prelude 
any determinate results whatsoever. 
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Alternatively, were Robbins mistaken that interpersonal utility 
comparisons are normative, a distinct, perhaps more subtle difficulty 
arises. Philosophers since Hume have argued that "ought' cannot 
be inferred from "is', that is, that evaluative statements cannot be 
inferred from positive ones. Thus, should comparison of individuals' 
cardinal utility indexes be characterizable in positive, non-normative 
terms, then the maximization of W, a normative judgment that social 
welfare ought to be at a maximum, would represent the attempt to 
derive an evaluative statement from positive ones based on interper-
sonal comparisons of utility. On logical grounds, then, such judg-
ments could never be justified, and the Kemp-Ng results would in 
fact preclude inferring the desirability of a utility maximum, though 
not is virtue of the rationale of their impossibility theorem. 
The dilemma for social welfare function analysis, then, is that while 
interpersonal utility comparison are indispensable to the determina-
tion of a utility maximum, their interpretation as either normative or 
positive produces conclusions which are unacceptable. This paper 
attempts to resolve this dilemma by reinterpreting these latter 
alternatives. That is, interpersonal utility comparisons are said to be 
neither normative nor positive, but descriptive and value-laden. As 
such, they are non-normative in that they do not involve the use of 
facts to evaluate social arrangements in terms of the traditional 
normative concerns of welfare, justice, or fairness. At the same 
time, they are non-positive in that they presuppose (non-normative) 
values. 
The following section of this paper critically examines Robbins' view 
(1933, 1937) that interpersonal utility comparisons are normative. It 
is argued that it remains to be shown that interpersonal utility 
comparisons are normative. The succeeding section characterizes 
the way in which evaluative statements can be derived from "is'. 
Interpersonal utility comparisons are shown to be embodied in 
descriptive statements. The final section argues that these descrip-
tive statements are objective, despite being value-laden, thus justify-
ing the use of interpersonal utility comparisons in economics for 
social welfare function analysis, while at the same time restoring the 
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2. Robbins' View of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons 
In the last chapter of his influential An Essay on the Nature and 
Significance of Economic Science (1937) Robbins criticizes the 
cardinalist law of diminishing marginal utility, particularly in its 
application to income transfers from the rich to the poor. In his 
view, though the argument for such transfers appears initially 
plausible, in fact, because its assumptions 'can never be verified by 
observation or introspection' , it 'begs the great metaphysical 
question of the scientific comparability of different individual 
experiences'. Indeed since there is nothing problematic in compar-
ing or ordering a number of alternatives an individual encounters, 
nor in comparing one individual's orderings with those of others, the 
theory of exchange should avoid cardinal interpersonal utility 
comparisons. To do otherwise is to admit 'an element of conven-
tional valuation' to the theory that renders it 'essentially norma-
tive' (Robbins, 1937, p.139). 
Interpersonal utility comparisons, then, are non-scientific and 
normative, because they possess 'an element of conventional 
evaluation', For Robbins, 
'the very diversity of the assumptions actually made at 
different times and in different times and in different 
places (in making interpersonal comparisons) is evidence 
of their conventional nature" (Robbins, 1937, p.140). 
Yet though such assumptions are convenient and intrinsic to the 
daily practice of making interpersonal comparisons, it is not possible 
to demonstrate that these assumptions rest in any way 'on ascer-
tainable fact' . And, if interpersonal comparisons are basically 
justified 
'on grounds of general convenience [ ••. or ••. ] by appeal to 
ultimate standards of obligation [ ... they] cannot be jus-
tified by any kind of positive science" (Robbins, 1937, 
p.141). 
Granted, then, that interpersonal utility comparisons do rest upon 
'an element of conventional evaluation," that is, that they are 
value-laden or incorporate assumptions that cannot be justified 
factually, it still does not follow that they are specifically normative. 
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Values and value judgments are diverse in character, ranging across 
a variety of non-normative forms in even scientific argument: e.g., 
whether an inference is valid is a value judgment, whether Ockham's 
razor should be employed is a value judgment, that an elegant and 
concise proof is preferred to one not so, etc .. Normative value 
judgments, however, are of a specific nature. They represent to use 
facts in a particular sort of evaluation of social arrangements or 
decisions, namely, to draw specific conclusions about social welfare, 
justice, fairness, etc. Thus, it remains to be shown that the value-
laden nature of interpersonal utility comparisons implies these 
comparisons are normative. Indeed., Robbins does not explicitly 
argue that this is the case, but rather seems to suggest sometimes 
that being value-laden is tantamount to being normative, and other 
times that interpersonal comparisons are simply objectionable 
whether value-laden or normative. 
Indeed, it seems that what is most objectionable about interpersonal 
utility comparisons for Robbins is their lack of scientific status. That 
they can vary across time and place implies that they are not objec-
tive as presumably are scientific statements. Thus the determination 
of an individual's sense of satisfaction must rely on observation and 
interpretation of behavior or introspection. Yet reports of each of 
these is not susceptible to verification. That in everyday life individ-
uals make interpersonal utility comparisons by adopting conventions 
of interpretation at best, then, only demonstrates the non-objective 
nature of these comparisons. 
This view seems more central to Robbins' thinking. It is the subject 
of the discussion in the final section below. It is fair to say at this 
point, however, that though Robbins is generally taken to shown 
interpersonal utility comparisons to be normative, he in fact does 
not make this case. This is significant, because most of the recent 
research on interpersonal utility comparisons assumes that they are 
indeed so, and because, as argued above, such an assumption ulti-
mately jeopardizes the distinction between explanation and recom-
mendation in economics.2 Thus, since this paper will argue that 
interpersonal utility comparisons are descriptive, that is value-laden 
but not normative, it is appropriate to first consider how interper-
sonal utility comparisons permit inferring 'ought· from 'is·, so as 
to avoid the second hom of the dilemma characterized above. 
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3. How to derive 'ought" from 'is" 
Mueller (1979) inadvertently captures the difficulty associated with 
inferring 'ought" from 'is" in his suggested response to Hume: 
'As David Hume pointed long ago, propositions concern-
ing values cannot be derived from factual observations 
alone. Some intuitive conceptualization of right and wrong, 
of acceptable and unacceptable is required. Thus, efforts to 
introduce values into collective choice in a nonarbitrary 
way become a search for a community's shared notions of 
justice and morality" (Mueller, 1979, p.265). 
That" is since one cannot move logically from purely factual proposi-
tions to evaluative ones, it is necessary to introduce values in an 
'intuitive fashion," that is, by consulting one's sense of a commun-
ity's shared values, with out attempting to base this intuition upon 
any factual characterization of that community. Yet, it is notorious 
that one individual's notion of what is shared differs from that of 
other individuals. Thus an 'intuitive" grasp of shared values can 
hardly be counted on to be 'nonarbitrary", such that the transition 
from purely factual propositions to evaluate ones appears insur-
mountable as Hume claimed. 
Closer attention to the logical principle Hume relies upon, however, 
reveals the way in which evaluative propositions can indeed be 
derived from factual ones. Generally, there cannot be anything in 
the conclusion of an inference that is not contained in its premisses. 
More specifically, unless an inference's premises themselves contain 
elements of evaluation, it is not possible to draw a conclusion that is 
itself evaluative in nature. Thus, an evaluative proposition can 
indeed be derived from a factual one when, in some manner, the 
factual proposition implicitly contains evaluative elements or is not 
purely factual. In fact, this sort of inference is more common that is 
customarily believed. Specifically, though the factual proposition in 
an inference often appears purely positive and value-free, in many 
cases the descriptive language of the proposition is value-laden. In 
such instances it is not inappropriate to infer an evaluative proposi-
tion from a factual one, and indeed this is a legitimate way in which 
normative judgments may drawn from description. 
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This is best demonstrated by an example. The following inference 
employs one factual proposition as the premise for an evaluative 
proposition: 
(1) Smith is an airline pilot. 
(2) Except under unusual circumstances, Smith, as airline pilot 
ought not crash the plane Smith pilots. 
As in many similar examples that could be constructed, the con-
clusions follows legitimately from the premise, because the con-
clusion follows legitimately from the premises, because the premise 
presupposes an additional premise that justifies inferring the con-
clusion: 
(1.1) Except under unusual circumstances, being an airline 
pilot means ought not crash the plane one pilots. 
Thus, the inference is valid, because the conclusion contains nothing 
not present in the premises, once (1.1) is identified as implicit in or 
presupposed by (1). Yet (1) is a factual proposition, and (2) is an 
evaluative one, such that 'ought" is derived from 'is". 
Nor are examples of the sort above exceptional or unusual. The 
inference above merely makes use of a descriptive concept (airline 
pilot) that is functional. Functional concepts are those concepts that 
characterize things designed for or put to some purpose by charac-
terizing good instances of those things or how those things ought to 
function. Thus (1) characterizes airline pilots by saying what an 
individual ought to do to be an airline pilot or what a good airline 
pilot is. In this sense airline pilot is an functional concept which is 
both descriptive and value-laden. The employment of such concepts 
permits inferring evaluative propositions from factual ones when the 
latter embody the evaluative propositions that characterize these 
concepts. Thus, though it appears Hume's law is violated, in fact it 
is not, since, as in the example above, an evaluative proposition is 
not derived from a purely positive one, though it is derived from a 
factual one. 
Economics, as other social sciences, makes considerable use of 
functional concepts. In the present connection, the concept of an 
interpersonal utility comparison is functional Thus, one character-
izes an interpersonal utility comparison by characterizing what a 
good interpersonal utility comparison requires or what an interper-
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sonal utility comparison ought to accomplish, that is, one which 
impartially and accurately compares the respective utilities from 
some choice or action of different individuals with the determina-
tion of a utility maximum in mind. 3 Accordingly, the employment of 
interpersonal utility comparisons permits one to infer evaluative 
propositions from factual ones, in the manner of the example above. 
Thus: 
(1) The transfer of commodity x from Smith to Jones increases 
total utility by adding more to Jones' utility than is derived from 
Smith's. 
(2) Commodity x ought to be transferred from Smith to Jones. 
This inference, as the one above, is valid once the premise implicit 
in (1), the interpersonal utility comparison, is identified. 
Thus: (1.1) Transfers of commodities that increases total utility by 
adding more one to individual's utility more than is subtracted from 
another's ought to be effected. 
The premise implicit in (1) tells us that the idea of an interpersonal 
utility comparison includes the recommendation to carry out total 
utility increasing transfers. Indeed, interpersonal are made solely 
with the intention of making transfers that increase total utility. Yet 
(1) itself merely describes the effect on total utility of a particular 
commodity transfer, so that again, an evaluative proposition (2) is 
derived from a factual one (1), or 'ought' is derived from 'is'. 
What the example immediately above demonstrates, then, is that 
once the concept of an interpersonal utility comparison is under-
stood to be functional it is possible to surmount the second hom of 
the dilemma confronting social welfare function analysis. Functional 
concepts are descriptive in the sense of being value-laden, though 
they are not thereby normative. Thus, given the Kemp-Ng impossi-
bility theorem demonstrating the necessity of preference intensity 
information for determining utility maximization, the interpersonal 
utility comparisons permit evaluative conclusions - normative 
judgments - that both preserve the distinction between explanation 
and recommendation in economics and avoid violation of Hume's 
law. 
Of course, though the inference above is valid, many would object 
that either interpersonal utility comparisons cannot be made, or 
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they cannot be made without making normative judgments. Thus, 
while there may well be many functional concepts in economics that 
permit inferring evaluative propositions from factual ones, the 
concept of an interpersonal utility comparison, many would assert, 
does not fall within this group. Put differently, Robbins' objection to 
such comparisons deserves reexamination to determine whether 
interpersonal utility comparisons are indeed descriptive in the 
manner suggested. 
4. The objectivity of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons 
Sen (1979) surveys descriptive and normative interpretations of 
interpersonal utility comparisons without judging the plausibility of 
either interpretation. Yet for the most part, the burden of argument 
has rested with those who claim that such comparisons are descrip-
tive in the sense of being fully positive, since the very suggestion 
that certain solutions to the problems associated with the compari-
son of different individuals' interests produce reasonable results 
when the social welfare maximum is explained itself at the very least 
suggests that the purported descriptive characterizations of individ-
uals' interests are ultimately normative. In effect, a reasonable 
account of determining the social welfare maximum, so that those 
intent upon describing the social welfare maximum, so that those 
intent upon describing how comparisons of individuals' interests are 
actually made in fact find themselves charged with prescnoing how 
such comparisons ought to be made. 
One of the more notable attempts to provide a descriptive and fully 
positive characterization of interpersonal utility comparisons 
founders on precisely this problem. Harsanyi (1955) claims in his 
influential treatment of the social welfare function that 
'interpersonal comparisons of utility are not value judg-
ments based on some ethical or political postulates but 
rather factual propositions based on certain principles of 
inductive logic' (Harsanyi, 1955, p.282). 
Harsanyi distinguishes an individual's personal preferences from that 
individual's moral of social preferences, requires that both sets 
satisfy the von Neumann-Morgenstem-Marschak: axioms of choice, 
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and argues that the social welfare function is a weighted sum of the 
individual utilities. Yet use of the von Neumann-Morgenstern-
Marschak axioms introduces an element of arbitrariness into the 
analysis of cardinal utility, because the impartial observer respon-
sible for assigning a set of weights to be attached to the positions of 
each individual in the determination of a social welfare maximum 
cannot but reflect a particular preference for risk (Pattanaik, 1968; 
Sen, 1970). Thus, though Harsanyi conceives the impartial observer 
as having an equal probability of being in the position of each of the 
n individuals in the alternative conceptions of society ranked 
according to their expected utilities, the impartial observer still 
exercises a particular taste for the risk of being in any such position. 
Harsanyi, accordingly, must ultimately recommend his account by 
emphasizing the impartiality that ought to obtain in the observer's 
assessment of each individual's subjective utility levels in different 
social states. That is, he must argue that his analysis produces a 
reasonable account of the social welfare maximum in the sense of 
being fair and impartial. This undermines his own claim to a fully 
positive, non-normative characterization of interpersonal utility 
comparisons, since values and seemingly normative judgments are 
implicit in this emphasis on impartiality.4 
Difficulties such as Harsanyi's, however, point toward a strategy in 
any interpretation of interpersonal utility comparisons as descriptive 
and non-normative. The essential problem with many such attempts 
is that their authors assume that a descriptive characterization of 
interpersonal utility comparisons must be fully positive, despite the 
fact that the concept of an interpersonal utility comparison in 
relation to the determination of an social welfare maximum is 
clearly functional and thus value-laden. Accordingly, critics cannot 
but suspect that purported positive characterizations of interper-
sonal utility comparisons that are ostensibly value-laden have been 
formulated with an eye to particular subsequent normative results, 
though their authors may well be chiefly motivated by questions that 
concern a good characterization of interpersonal utility comparisons 
in the functional rather than normative sense of the term. 
The serious issue, then, is whether one can in fact distinguish a 
descriptive account of interpersonal utility comparisons that is 
simply value-laden in the functional sense from one that is indeed 
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ultimately normative though formulated in descriptive language. The 
criterion for making such a distinction seems to rest in the distinc-
tion between kinds of value. Values functional to a given concept 
must be non-discretionary in that they are tied to the very definition 
of that concept. They cannot be the subject of choice in the case of 
any concept whose definition is generally agreed upon. Thus, to say 
what an interpersonal utility comparison is amounts to saying what a 
good interpersonal utility comparison is, such that the very meaning 
of the concept determines the way in which it is value-laden. 
Accordingly, if it can be said that the author of a proposed descrip-
tive account of interpersonal utility comparisons had discretion over 
which values are incorporated in that account, then it seems that 
one must conclude that the characterization of interpersonal com-
parisons in question has been formulated with an eye to subsequent 
normative judgments. A normative conception of interpersonal 
utility comparisons would, on the basis of this criterion, be appropri-
ately regarded as subjective in the specific sense that its content is 
discretionary. In contrast, if the values implicit in the concept are 
non-discretionary in the sense above, then the account of interper-
sonal utility comparisons is descriptive, though value-laden, and thus 
provides an objective basis for subsequent normative judgments 
regarding a social welfare maximum. This objective basis, moreover, 
would permit an inference from descriptive propositions to evalu-
ative ones, thus laying a foundation for normative judgment in 
economics that preserves the distinction between explanation and 
recommendation. 
That one can look upon the values implicit in interpersonal utility 
comparisons in this way is suggested by the understanding of inter-
personal comparisons present in recent, influential philosophy of 
language theories of the interpretation of meaning. S In these 
theories, the interpretation of another's meaning - whatever the 
subject matter of the statements interpreted - can be said to be 
objective in the specific sense that the interpretation of another's 
meaning, though a value-laden enterprise, is neither consciously nor 
unconsciously carried out with an eye to any subsequent judgments 
whatsoever. Interpretation of another's meaning, of course is 
precisely what is involved in interpersonal utility comparisons, since 
they would presuppose that one can determine, largely in terms of 
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other's reports, the relation between the intensity of their tastes and 
the statements they make about those tastes. Thus, in the words of 
one proponent of these views, 
'interpersonal have a basis in the sense that in the process 
of attributing propositional attitudes like beliefs, desires, 
and preferences to others interpersonal are necessarily 
made' (Davidson, 1986, p.203). 
That is, the day-to-day attribution of various propositional attitudes 
(x's belief that such and such, x's desire that such and such, etc.) 
involves the interpretation of others' meanings in a fashion that 
presupPQses an objective basis for these attnbutions in individuals' 
ability to make interpersonal comparisons. Indeed, that such com-
parisons are 'necessarily' made implies, on this view, that the basis 
on which interpersonal comparisons are made is neither consciously 
nor unconsciously determined, and thus cannot be said to be discre-
tionary in the subjective sense of having been proposed with an eye 
to particular, subsequent normative judgments. 
The philosophical theories of meaning interpretation in question 
stem from Quine's (1951) arguments that sameness of meaning, or 
synonymy, is not linguistically transparent. Sameness of meaning is 
empirically determined in that one individual's interpretation of 
another individual's sentences must ultimately depend upon the 
experience of the former in querying the latter's assent and dissent 
regarding the latter's meaning (Quine, 1960; 1976). An individual's 
meaning is thus not some mental phenomenon that might be ident-
ified apart from what the evidence of those queries would support, 
and accordingly, if it can indeed be said that individuals can success-
fully interpret one anothers' meanings, then they must have done so 
by making successful interpersonal comparisons in the process. 
Most importantly, in the absence of any mentalistic meaning entities 
to anchor interpretation, a certain 'indeterminacy of translation' is 
clearly inescapable in any interpreter's account of another's meaning 
(Quine, 1989). This inevitable indeterminacy of interpretation -
whether in the attribution of beliefs, desires, or preferences to 
others - makes it necessary to understand interpretation within 
framework of standards, values, and assumptions that are functional 
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to successful interpretation of others' meaning. At the same time, 
that this framework is indispensable in the determination any of 
meaning whatsoever implies that the values implicit in interpretation 
of another's meaning are not the subject of choice, but are consti-
tutive of an individual's interpretation of other's meanings. 
This is perhaps clearest in the explanation of an interpreter's 
attribution of a particular belief to some individual on the basis of 
that's individual's assertions. Generally, the attribution of a belief to 
another is made against a background of assumptions concerning 
that individual's other beliefs, desires, and intentions (Davidson, 
1986, pp.203-206). This assessment necessarily makes use of the 
interpreter's own standards of consistency and of what is valuable, 
though the successful attribution of a belief to another depends 
upon placing the mind of the interpreter and the mind of the 
individual whose belief is being identified 
'in nearly enough the same realm of reason and the same 
material realm' (Davidson, 1986, p.206). 
In effect, the interpreter produces an acceptable interpretation of 
another's belief when relying upon the same, commonly held prin-
ciples of meaning as does the individual's belief-expressing assertion 
itself make use of these same principles of communication and 
interpretation. 
Of course, it is not to be denied that errors in interpretation and 
attribution are on occasion inevitable. Indeed, they may not be 
infrequent. Yet to suggest that error is the rule is to adopt a perva-
sive skepticism that denies communication and meaning are possible 
altogether. Moreover, it is not clear that it is not self-contradictory 
to assert one cannot successfully interpret another's meanings, since 
one's own meanings from occasion to occasion must be translatable 
with on another by means of the same standards, assumptions, etc. 
one uses to interpret other's meanings. The notion of an 'indeter-
minacy of translation', thus serves to emphasize the specific func-
tional basis on which interpretation of meaning can generally be 
said to objectively occur by indicating the fundamental role of 
commonly held values, standards, and assumptions in this process. 
The attnoution of interests, desires, or preferences to others is no 
more nor less problematic than the attnoution to them of their 
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beliefs. The suspicion that it is more difficult to interpret another's 
tastes rests on the mistaken presumption that the attnoution of 
belief is by comparison not problematic, that cognitive meaning is 
linguistically transparent and psychologically primary, and that an 
interpreter's values and standards need not play a role in the char-
acterization of another's beliefs. Yet the attnoution of beliefs to 
others is based on the ability to make interpersonal comparisons, so 
that it follows that this same ability to make interpersonal compari-
sons makes interpretation of other's tastes possible as well, despite 
the familiar problems with the practice of determining intensity of 
6 tastes. 
In the present connection, it should again be emphasized, that what 
legitimizes interpersonal utility comparisons is that the values 
undeniably present in their characterization are non-discretionary 
and non-normative. Normative value is discretionary in that one's 
positions regarding welfare, fairness, and equity are employed to 
recommend a particular use of facts to produce a particular set of 
normative judgments. In contrast, the values implicit in interpreta-
tion are not discretionary in that they are constitutive of coherent 
interpretation, and according are not the subject of individual 
discretion. Though in practice interpretation may well smuggle in 
normative value in both the interpretation of beliefs and the tastes 
of others - as when it is said an account claimed as objective in fact 
ideological - that this practice is characterizable as a departure from 
legitimate interpretation strongly suggests that objective interpreta-
tion of other's beliefs and tastes is the rule rather than the excep-
tion. 
s. Conclusion 
In the second inference above, it was said that implicit in the 
concept of an interpersonal comparison as a functional concept is 
the notion that a successful interpersonal comparison is one that 
permits the identification of net utility gains in a commodity transfer 
between individuals. A successful interpersonal utility comparison, 
then, depends first and foremost upon the functional value of 
coDSistency in interpretation of tastes, irrespective of the individuals 
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involved. It is this value - equally well understood as impartiality -
that ultimately justifies the recommended commodity ought to be 
transferred. Thus, the descriptive premise (1) above' presupposes 
that an impartial comparison of the respective utilities of Smith and 
Jones for the purpose of determining a utility maximum dictates the 
commodity transfer that is prescribed in the conclusions (2). 
Thus evaluative propositions can be derived from descriptive ones in 
economics without violating Hume's law. At the same time, the 
distinction between explanation and recommendation is preserved in 
economics, while the difficulties that arise in the social welfare 
function framework, as a consequence of the Kemp-Ng impossibility 
theorem, are surmounted by the characterization of interpersonal 
utility comparisons in descriptive but value-laden terms. 
Notes 
1. 'In other words, SWFs (Social Welfare functions) of the 
Bergson-Samuelson type are subject to impossibility results not 
very different from those that apply to SWFs of the Arrow 
type.' 
2. For the literature on interpersonal utility comparisons, see 
Mueller (1979). 
3. Whether this is possible is discussed in the last section. 
4. See Mueller (1979, p.25S) on this emphasis. 
S. The literature is most often associated with Quine and 
Davidson. See Romanos (1983) for an examination of Quine's 
general influence. 
6. The construction of index numbers is methodologically prob-
lematic, yet at the same time in principle it is believed these 
difficulties can be adequately surmounted. The same applies to 
interpersonal utility comparisons on the argument here. Thus 
problems of setting a common zero point and scale are not 
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insignificant, yet not in principle obstacles the use of interper-
sonal utility comparisons. 
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